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ABSTRACT  
   
This thesis draws on industry experience and academic literature to highlight 
several problems facing the construction and facility management industries.  These 
problems include issues with product delivery performance and financial failures that 
often lead firms to spend much more than anticipated, while obtaining much less of a 
product.  Transaction-cost economics theory and literature are presented as a model for 
understanding, predicting, and preventing these problems.  Transaction-cost economics 
suggests that specificity and uncertainty, two key characteristics of industry transactions, 
are improperly aligned with governance structures, leading to preventable failures.  This 
thesis highlights several case studies in which these failures occur and argues that the 
correct application of this theory can mitigate many of these problems.  A final case study 
illustrates how this alignment can make a difference in outcome without a compromise of 
quality.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The industries of construction and facility management, hereafter referred to as 
the industry, can produce a challenging environment for both buyer and seller.  
Satisfaction for both parties may seem difficult to reach, sometimes on the simplest of 
projects.  Despite the owners controlling the initial budget, schedule, selection 
methodology, award criteria, contract, scope, requirements, and design, they often face 
challenges in receiving successful construction outcomes.  Challenges for sellers include 
poor productivity, change orders, buyer driven delays, contract disputes, cost overruns, 
and others.    
In addition to issues of product delivery, the industry also experiences significant 
quantities of failure in construction companies of all sizes, ages, and nationalities.  
Peterson (2013) refers to research by Dun and Bradstreet to note that “since 1988 the 
construction industry has experienced a higher-than-average business failure rate when 
compared to the failure rate of all businesses (Peterson, 2013).   
Peterson (2013) also refers to data from the Surety Information Office to assert 
that poor financial management is the primary source of business failure in the industry, 
citing “six broad warning signs that a construction company is in trouble”, four of these 
six being directly related to financial management: “ineffective financial management 
systems…bank lines of credit constantly borrowed to the limits…poor estimating and /or 
job cost reporting…poor project management…no comprehensive business plan…[and] 
communication problems (Surety Information Office, 2003)” (as cited in Peterson, 2013, 
p.3).  The two “warning signs” not related to financial management, poor project 
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management and communication problems, may be indicative of organizational rather 
than financial failures. 
These four “warning sings” of financial management failure could be more 
specifically described by the following seven areas of poor financial management: “1. 
Improper accounting procedures and systems; 2. Failure to manage the company’s cash 
flow; 3. Failure to accurately track and manage job and equipment costs; 4. Excessive 
overhead; 5. Failure to plan for and achieve an acceptable profit margin; 6. Excessive 
debt; and, 7. Failure to make business decision based on sound financial data” (Peterson, 
2013).   
Of this list, areas one and four seem self-explanatory; and, each of the other five 
are common in the industry.  Number two illustrates the inconsistent and irregular nature 
of the industry, which requires standard accounting and financial procedures to be 
modified to be compatible with payment terms of the project, as well as unusual cash 
flows, periodic progress payments, and retention.  Number three illustrates the 
disconnected nature of projects, scattered among various locations wherein “…employees 
and equipment must be tracked to ensure that their costs are charged to the correct job, 
and each must be managed as a profit center” (Peterson, 2013).  Number five illustrates 
risk, uncertainty, and complexity as “…construction companies often give a fixed price 
for a product that the company has never built, or never built using the local suppliers and 
subcontractors available at the project location” (Peterson, 2013).  Number six illustrates 
dependencies in the industry: a high demand for capital that may lead construction 
companies to utilize subcontractors to draw on their assets to expand labor, talent, or 
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financial capital during the construction process (Peterson, 2013).  And, number seven, 
closely related to number five, could be characteristic of uncertainty.   
In addition, the unique characteristics of space and time, or spatiotemporal 
characteristics, complicate the industry.  According to Peterson (2013), no other industry 
is as project based – with builders often producing unique, one-of-a-kind custom projects 
with great variations from project to project and among various owners.  These issues, 
along with differing site conditions, locations, labor, equipment, components, and 
materials make it difficult to forecast production costs; and, to bid future projects “to 
keep the company’s workforce fully utilized”, the company will need to know the costs 
of these differing mixes of variables for each project (Peterson, 2013).  These unique 
industry characteristics create uncertainty, variable frequency, and a type of specificity 
that limits effectiveness between projects, making it impossible to “store unused 
production in slow times for use on other, future projects” (Peterson, 2013). 
These challenges can be found in various magnitudes and combinations 
throughout the industry and have been the subject of numerous past research efforts.  
This thesis will explore reasons behind and suggest solutions for some of these industry 
concerns in the theory and case studies below.   
Table 1 summarizes problems and related characteristics discussed above, a few 
of which were noted by Peterson (2013).   
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Table 1. 
 
Summary of Facilities and Construction Industry Problems and Characteristics 
 
Problems (Results) Characteristics (Inputs) 
Poor Performance – unwanted results 
     dissatisfied buyers 
     delays 
     disputes 
     compromised quality 
     compromised safety 
     cost overruns 
Company Failure 
     poor financial management 
     bankruptcy 
     poor organizational management 
Inconsistency  
Irregularity  
Variability 
Disconnectedness 
Uncertainty 
Complexity 
Risk  
Dependencies and Relationships 
Specificity 
     spatiotemporal  
     project based 
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CHAPTER 2 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND PURPOSE OF THESIS 
The purpose of this thesis is to explain some of the characteristics and problems 
that stress the industry, causing performance and financial failures.  This work proposes 
that there is a cause and effect relationship between the characteristics and resulting 
problems identified above that can support decision making, offer systematic 
predictability, and thus improve performance in the field.   
Hypothesis Statement:   
Construction and facility project performance may be predictable based on 
characteristics and organization of the project, making it possible to mitigate failure and 
optimize performance.     
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CHAPTER 3 
THESIS OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE 
Goal: 
The goal of this thesis is to identify theory that will predict outcome, support 
efforts to reduce failure, and improve optimal performance.   
Methodology: 
 Transaction-cost economics theory (TCE) is utilized as an analytical model to 
understand the characteristics of the construction and facility industry in relation to 
performance and outcome.  TCE literature is laid out to identify relevant principles and 
how they relate to industry transactions.   
 Historical project data is presented to demonstrate a sense of uncertainty in 
project costs.  Four case studies apply TCE principles to a contracted project, a contracted 
service, and two experiments with administrative controls, respectively.  A fifth, and final 
case study applies the principles of TCE to four alternative projects to test for improved 
performance and reduced costs.  The thesis then discusses data, results of the study, and 
concludes.    
Scope: 
 This thesis uses a case study approach to recognize compelling relationships 
between TCE and transactions in the industry to understand project outcome in relation to 
industry characteristics and corresponding project organization; and, thus offer a valid 
theoretical base for further exploration of TCE applications in the industry.   
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CHAPTER 4 
SUMMARY OF THESIS 
This thesis proposes that problems within the construction and facility industry 
may be predictable and preventable once the logic behind the relationships in Table 1 is 
understood.  Transaction-cost economics theory (TCE) provides a useful analytical model 
for understanding industry performance, or, in other words, the relationships between 
these industry inputs and outputs shown in Table 1.  In TCE the primary inputs, or 
characteristics of a transaction, yield efficiency and optimal output when aligned with 
complementary forms of coordination otherwise known as organization, and often 
referred to in TCE as governance (Williamson, 1991).  Put differently, TCE proposes that 
optimal performance results from aligning characteristics of transactions with their 
complementary forms of governance.   
Oliver E. Williamson, who received the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic 
Sciences; and, R.H. Coase, have both made significant contributions to TCE, and their 
works will be heavily utilized in this thesis.  There is no attempt to further develop, add 
to, or criticize their works in this thesis.  Rather, this thesis attempts to find applications 
for their brilliant work in construction and facility industry transactions.  The works of 
others who have further developed TCE are also drawn upon for use in this thesis, each is 
cited throughout and then referenced at the end of this work.  
Governance in TCE refers to three generic forms of coordination, or economic 
organization, in which to conduct production.  These range along a spectrum, from the 
firm, or subordination, also known as hierarchy, at one polar end, to market, or 
autonomy, at the other end; and, hybrid forms of coordination in-between.  These are 
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discussed in greater detail in chapter five.  Subordination is found in firms, or 
organizations, generically termed hierarchy, where authority, represented by a servant-
master relationship dictates the behavior of employees to carry out production.  
Autonomy, however, is found in market organization, where transacting parties realize 
greater ownership, and production is carried out by individual owners.  Hybrid forms of 
governance may apply in-between the firm and market forms of governance, where types 
of variants between these two are needed.  Transactions are defined by certain attributes 
that when paired with these corresponding generic forms of governance, hierarchy, 
hybrid, or market, result in optimal performance (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1991).  The 
following chapter will present TCE theory and explain governance and transaction 
characteristics.  These are then applied throughout several case studies below.   
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CHAPTER 5 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND TRANSACTION COST THEORY 
TCE references the price mechanism, or law of supply and demand, so this will 
briefly be visited before moving further into TCE literatures.  The price mechanism 
outlines the relationship between price and quantity for a buyer (demand) and a seller 
(supplier) in an exchange of goods or services (product).  Both buyer and seller are self-
interested parties that interact to reach an equilibrium price where the supply of a product 
is balanced with the demand for a product, leaving neither a surplus nor shortage in the 
market – satisfying each party relative to the conditions.  The relationship between price 
and quantity is intrinsic to the interests of each party, with the seller willing to supply less 
at lower prices and the buyer willing to demand less at higher prices.  This exchange is 
measurable for each party by their cost in the transaction compared to costs of other, 
competing or substitute opportunities.  Rational decision-makers take the path of least 
resistance, or the best value.  In addition, each side of the exchange is defined to some 
degree by the important variables that shift demand and supply.   
R. H. Coase, one of the early visionaries of transaction cost economics (TCE) 
notes that resource allocation, coordination, or production is done without central control 
in a competitive economic system through the elastic, responsive, and automatic price 
mechanism; i.e. “through a series of exchange transactions on the market” (Coase, 1937).  
Alternatively, the firm, also referred to as hierarchy or organization, arises through the 
voluntary efforts of the entrepreneur-coordinator to substitute the price mechanism where 
optimally planned coordination would more efficiently allocate resources or production at 
less cost.  The firm, a substitute within the larger economic system, “consists of the 
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systems of relationships which come into existence when the direction of resources is 
dependent on an entrepreneur” (Coase, 1937). 
Within the larger economic system, resource scarcity will demand a reciprocal 
level of efficiency for which these two alternative forms of governance (coordination) 
participate, market and hierarchy (firm) each adapting to direct production that best fits 
within its unique range of efficacy.  Analysis of costs and benefits relative to each of 
these discrete and alternative forms of governance facilitates the optimal alignment of 
transactions with the proper form of organization - coordination in the markets through 
price mechanism or direction within hierarchy.  Whether production is carried out by 
market or hierarchy is explained by Coase (1937) this way: 
“The question always is, will it pay to bring an extra exchange transaction under 
the organizing authority?  At the margin, the costs of organizing within the firm 
will be equal either to the costs of organizing in another firm or to the costs 
involved in leaving the transaction to be “organized” by the price mechanism.  
Businessmen will be constantly experimenting, controlling, and in this way, 
equilibrium will be maintained.” 
 
However, in order to select the best form of organization in which to conduct a 
specific transaction it is essential to understand the characteristics that define that 
transaction; the optimal alignment of a transaction with a fitting form of organization is 
the goal of TCE.  As Williamson notes, “Transaction-cost economics subscribes to 
Commons’ view that the transaction is the basic unit of analysis (Commons, 1924 and 
1934)” (as cited in Williamson, 1991, p. 281).  Williamson notes further that transaction 
as the basic unit of analysis, “takes on operational significance upon identifying the 
critical dimensions with respect to which transactions differ” and notes frequency, 
uncertainty, and asset specificity as three of these critical dimensions, with a greater 
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focus on asset specificity as the primary characteristics of any transaction (Williamson, 
1991; Nickerson and Silverman, 2003).   
Williamson then further identifies six types of asset-specificity that are important 
to recognize when pairing a transaction with a form of governance: “Site specificity, 
physical asset specificity, human-asset specificity, brand name capital, dedicated assets, 
and temporal specificity” (Williamson, 1991).  Only a few of these are considered in the 
case studies below.  Specificity is a trait that uniquely connects something to a certain 
subject.  For example, a person that has credentials as an electrician will be preferred to 
perform an electrical installation over a person that has credentials to install roofing 
materials because the task has a high level of human-asset specificity – it requires a 
certain skill (electrician) to do the job.  For similar reasons, no one wants a dermatologist 
to perform their dental work; or, their open-heart surgery.  There is a high level of 
specificity in open-heart surgery – very few physicians possess this skill.   
Another way to measure specificity is this, “The greater the difference between 
the value of an asset in its first-best and its next-best use, the more specific that asset is to 
the transaction (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1979)” (as quoted in 
Nickerson and Silverman, 2003, p. 434).  Asset specificity changes outcome trajectory 
with respect to transaction characteristics.  The painter will struggle to install the 
foundation of a house, for example.  Williamson (1991) puts it this way:  
“Although asset specificity can take the variety of forms, the common 
consequence is this: a condition of bilateral dependency builds up as asset 
specificity deepens.  The ideal transaction in law and economics – whereby the 
identities of buyer and sellers is irrelevant – obtains when asset specificity is zero.  
Identity matters as investments in transaction specific assets increase, since such 
specialized assets lose productive value when redeployed to best alternative uses 
and by best alternative users.”   
  12 
 
In other words, the lower the specificity, the more generic it becomes.  It doesn’t matter 
who does the work because it’s so simple that anyone can successfully complete the task. 
Table 2, which includes attributes of governance developed by Williamson, 
identifies the characteristics of transactions and forms of governance that have been 
discussed previously.  Case studies later in this thesis refer to these three focal points.     
Table 2. 
Transaction Characteristics and Forms of Governance (Williamson, 1991) 
Transaction Characteristics Forms of Governance Attributes of Governance 
Uncertainty 
Frequency 
Asset Specificity: Site 
specificity, physical asset 
specificity, human-asset 
specificity, brand name 
capital, dedicated assets, 
and temporal specificity 
Hierarchy 
Hybrid 
Market 
Contract Law 
Adaptability 
Incentive Intensity 
Administrative Controls 
 
 Best costs are to be found in “discriminating alignments” of transaction qualities 
with their compatible forms of governance; the key to understanding discriminating 
alignments is explained by Williamson (1991) this way: 
 “each viable form of governance – market, hybrid and hierarchy – is defined by a 
syndrome of attributes that bear a supporting relation to one another.  Many 
hypothetical forms of organization never arise, or quickly die out, because they 
combine inconsistent features.”  
  
 Optimal alignment prevails with a “discriminating alignment” of transaction 
characteristics with appropriate governance form; Williamson (1991) put it this way: 
“The discriminating alignment hypothesis to which transaction-cost economics 
owes much of its predictive content holds that transactions, which differ in their 
attributes, are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their costs and 
competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, transaction-cost-economizing) way.”  
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Williamson (1991) proceeds to ask, with respect to governance structures, “what 
are the factors that are responsible for the aforementioned differential costs and 
competencies?”  Governance forms, generically labeled as market, hybrid, and hierarchy, 
are defined by several focal factors, including contract law, differences in adaptability, 
and incentive and administrative control instruments (Williamson, 1991).  Table 3 
outlines dimensions of the governance forms and attributes developed by Williamson.   
Table 3. 
Governance forms and Corresponding Characteristics (Williamson, 1991) 
Governance 
Forms 
 Attributes 
Contract Law Adaptation Incentive 
Intensity 
Administrative 
Controls 
Market Classic 
Contract 
Adaptation (A) Individual 
ownership 
Between 
individuals 
Hybrid Neoclassic 
Contract 
Adaptations 
(A) and (C) 
Individual 
ownership/Fiat 
 
Hierarchy Forbearance  Adaptation (C) Fiat Within 
company 
 
Each form of governance and the associated characteristics, noted in Table 3, and 
listed in table 4, are addressed directly next in this thesis.  The approach here is to look at 
each of the attributes within its corresponding form of governance, along with some 
examples and explanation.  Later in this chapter, after governance forms and 
characteristics have been addressed, the characteristics of transactions are developed 
further.  All concepts and principles in this section are taken from Williamson (1991).   
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Table 4. 
 
List of Terms (Williamson, 1991) 
 
Governance Form, Market:  
Governance Form, Hybrid: 
Governance Form, Hierarchy: 
Governance Attribute, Contract Law: 
Governance Attribute, Adaptation: 
Governance Attribute, Incentive Intensity: 
Governance Attribute, Administrative Controls: 
Transaction Characteristic, Frequency: 
Transaction Characteristic, Uncertainty: 
Transaction Characteristic, Asset-specificity: 
 
Market Governance Form:   
Market, as noted previously, is a form of organizing or coordinating production in 
the larger economic system.  Transactions are carried out in market by autonomous 
individuals, owners who regulate their business affairs based on the indicators of the 
price mechanism.   
Market Governance Attribute, Contract Law:  Market governance works on the 
principles of classic contract law, which protects market actors and structures relations.  
Williamson (1991) describes classic contract law this way, it “applies to the ideal 
transaction in law and economics – “sharp in by clear agreement; sharp out by clear 
performance (Macneil, 1974)” – in which the identity of the parties is irrelevant” (as cited 
in Williamson, 1991, p. 271).  Here an irrelevant identity refers to the absence of types of 
dependencies, which we learn from Williamson (1991) is proportional to levels of 
uncertainty.  In the focal industry, where complexity and uncertainty seem to be more or 
less present in a project-oriented environment, this ideal may at times be more difficult to 
reach.  Participants become fewer and more specialized, and exchanges more customized.  
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Market Governance Attribute, Adaptation:  In market, where adaptations are 
made in response to disturbances in prices, autonomous parties interpret market signals in 
the market mechanism and individually adjust.  Williamson (1991) calls this autonomous 
adaptation, or “Adaptation (A).”   Full ownership of all consequences here provides the 
incentive for individuals to make adaptations in ways that benefit both themselves and 
the overall economic system - the market mechanism was briefly addressed early in this 
chapter.  Williamson (1991) notes, that here “consumers and producers respond 
independently to parametric price changes so as to maximize their utility and profits, 
respectively.”  In the project environment, where classic contract law is traditionally a 
significant force, means and methods are at the contractors discretion.  However, more or 
less of the presence of uncertainty unavoidably alters the classical market dynamic. 
Market Governance Attribute, Incentive Intensity: As just mentioned in the 
section on adaptation, full ownership of all consequences here provides a strong incentive 
intensity for individuals to perform.  Full rights to all rewards create a strong incentive to 
perform strategically.  Given the unique nature of the project-oriented environment with 
an increase in uncertainty, there may be an incentive to behave opportunistically.  As 
Williamson (1991) notes, “From an economic point of view, the tradeoff that needs to be 
faced in excusing contract performance is between stronger incentives and reduced 
opportunism.”  As levels of uncertainty rise and market players become fewer and more 
specialized, and changes in the classic market dynamic of adaptation may introduce 
opportunism, this problem may be offset by a concern towards reputation among market 
participants.  Williamson (1991) puts it this way:  
  16 
“assume that it is possible to identify a community of traders in which reputation 
effects work better (or worse).  Improved reputation effects attenuate incentives to 
behave opportunistically in interfirm trade – since the immediate gains from opportunism 
in a regime where reputation counts must be traded off against future costs.”  
  
Market Governance Attribute, Administrative Controls:  There is no need for 
administrative controls in market governance.  With independent parties and private 
ownership there is no need for an administrator to direct, regulate, or organize the parties 
of production. 
Hierarchy Governance Form:   
Hierarchy, as noted previously, is a form of organizing or coordinating production 
in the larger economic system where the efficacy of the coordinator-entrepreneur is 
optimal.  Transactions are carried out in hierarchy, or firm, by employees, often in 
servant-and-master types of relationships as noted by Coase (1937).    
Hierarchy Governance Attribute, Contract Law:  The form of law that supports 
this type of governance is forbearance doctrine and the “business judgement rule (Gilson, 
1986)” (as quoted in Williamson, 1991, p. 274).  Outside of legal issues surrounding 
human rights, or crime, courts won’t hear disputes from within companies, these must be 
settled within the company (Williamson, 1991).  This provides hierarchy with fiat, or the 
authority to direct business as it sees fit to do so within the boundaries of the law and 
internal agreements.  The institution in which this thesis is conducted is a hierarchical 
form of organization, with a very strong tier of management and chain-of-command.  
Like market, this attribute comes with pros and cons that are outlined in the next few 
paragraphs.   
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Hierarchy Governance Attribute, Adaptation:  Adaptations in hierarchy occur in 
response to a need for greater coordination and cooperation, these are termed, 
“Adaptation (C)” by Williamson (1991).  The need for “Adaptation C” typically 
accompanies greater specificity and its companion, bilateral dependency (Williamson, 
1991).  This is the “kind of cooperation among men that is conscious, deliberate, 
purposeful (Barnard, 1938)” and creates “convergent expectations” (as cited in 
Williamson, 1991, p. 278).  This is a necessary characteristic of the firm, since 
individuals are not individually connected to the price mechanism and even if they were, 
they could each “operate at cross-purposes or otherwise sub optimize” (Williamson, 
1991).  Therefore, being able and willing to understand and follow instructions is a 
significant part of firm employment – and one with its own challenges.   
Hierarchy Governance Attribute, Incentive Intensity:  Unlike market, ownership 
here is subverted by fiat, authority or subordination, in a servant-and-master relationship.  
Therefore, incentive intensity is traditionally weak.  The owner could pay Employee A 
and B comparatively the same amount whether they go the extra mile or not, thus 
flattening the incentive structure.  Since employees don’t technically possess ownership, 
they aren’t likely to have a say in their compensation regardless of whether things go 
better or worse for the company.  Nickerson and Zenger (2008) assert that a significant 
cost of the firm is this flat incentive structure and it’s tendency to create “social 
comparison costs”, “envy”, “inequality and behavioral strategies” among employees.  
Hierarchy Governance Attribute, Administrative Controls:  Administrative 
controls are a strength of hierarchy, as it can, through fiat, organize coordination, control, 
and direct cooperation where there is a growing presence of asset specificity, uncertainty, 
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or forms of dependency that are cost prohibitive for market (Williamson, 1991).  
Williamson (1991) notes that the survival of a company, in uncertain environments, 
“depends upon the maintenance of an equilibrium of complex character….[This] calls for 
readjustment of processes internal to the organization…, [whence] the center of our 
interest is the process by which [adaptation] is accomplished (Barnard, 1938)” (as cited in 
Williamson, 1991, p. 278).  However, this strength of hierarchy can also become a point 
of failure; Williamson (1991) notes that these adaptive advantages have costs, they can 
“degrade incentive intensity”, and add “bureaucratic costs”.  Furthermore, Williamson 
(1991) notes that incentive intensity is simply an instrument that can be used as an 
administrative control, “If added incentive intensity gets in the way of bilateral 
adaptability, then weaker incentive intensity supported by added administrative controls 
(monitoring and career rewards and penalties) can be optimal.” 
There are other limits to the efficacy of hierarchy, diminishing returns of 
management, and “diseconomies of scope and sale” (Coase, 1937).  Losses through 
mistakes of management, inefficiency, waste of resources, and failure to best use and 
align labor and resources with their highest value will increase as spatial distribution 
(different places) and dissimilarity (different kinds) of transactions increase – potentially 
making the transactions better suited for the market (Coase, 1937).  The probability of 
shifts in supply or demand curves, may also increase the cost of organizing in the firm 
more than the market (Coase, 1937).  Innovations and management techniques that 
counteract these limits will be needed to compete with market governance alignment 
(Coase, 1937).  And, as mentioned, social comparison costs, envy, for example, also have 
a tremendous influence (Nickerson and Zenger, 2008).   
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Hybrid Governance Form:   
Hybrid is a form of organizing or coordinating production in the larger economic 
system that utilizes features of market governance to address aspects of autonomy; and, 
features of hierarchy governance to address aspects of uncertainty and asset specificity 
present in an exchange.  Transactions are carried out in hybrid organization by 
autonomous individuals, owners who regulate their business affairs based on the 
indicators of the price mechanism; but, also by greater focus on the contractual 
arrangement and relationship effects needed to deal with greater levels of specificity and 
uncertainty. 
 Hybrid Governance Attribute, Contract Law:  Hybrid governance works on the 
principles of neoclassic contract law (Williamson, 1991).  “Neoclassic contract law 
relieves parties from strict enforcement and applies to contracts where the parties to the 
transaction maintain autonomy but are bilaterally dependent to a nontrivial degree” 
(Williamson, 1991).  Williamson presents this law as a “contract as framework”:  
“highly adjustable, a framework which almost never accurately indicates real 
working relations, but which affords a rough indication around which such 
relations vary, an occasional guide in cases of doubt, and a norm of ultimate 
appeal when the relations cease in fact to work (Llewellyn, 1931)" (as cited in 
Williamson, 1991, p. 272).    
 
This form of law is legally weaker than classic contract law, so contracts must 
address this by adding additional “contractual safeguards” (Williamson, 1991). 
Hybrid Governance Attribute, Adaptation:  Hybrid retains some autonomy, so 
adaptations are still type (A); however, there is also a need for greater cooperation, 
especially as disturbances or adversity intensity increases, so there will also be 
adaptations of type (C), noted more fully in the section about hierarchy governance.   
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Hybrid Governance Attribute, Incentive Intensity:  With autonomy and ownership 
present here, the incentive intensity can still be strong.  As was noted in the market 
incentive intensity section previously, given the unique nature of the project-oriented 
environment with an increase in uncertainty, there may be an incentive to behave 
opportunistically in this form of governance. 
Hybrid Governance Attribute, Administrative Controls:  Administrative controls 
are weak here, because autonomy is strong by virtue of the upholding basis of law.  
However, as Williamson notes, (1991) this doesn’t preclude the parties from including 
“contractual safeguards”, “administrative apparatus”, “information disclosure”, and 
“dispute settlement machinery” into the contracts.  Relationship effects noted by 
Williamson (1991) can also play a role here. 
See Figures 1 and 2, which characterize the strengths and weaknesses of these 
three forms of governance and their attributes as discussed above (Williamson, 1991). 
Figure 1. Governance Costs as a Function of Asset Specificity (Williamson, 1991). 
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Figure 2. Distinguishing Attributes of Governance Forms (Williamson, 1991). 
With each form of governance and the corresponding attributes laid out above, it 
is now needful to discuss characteristics of transactions that determine outcome via 
alignment with these governance structures and attributes.  Transaction characteristics of 
frequency, uncertainty, and asset specificity are laid out below. 
Transaction Characteristic, Frequency: 
Contract frequency, where a higher quantity and longer duration of contracts would 
increase uncertainty and the need for greater coordination and integration - drives long-
term transactions into the firm.  In addition, classical contract language can become 
burdensome in situations like this, and if contractual safeguards and dispute settlement 
language isn’t included then autonomous parties may behave opportunistically, especially 
without the presence of bilateral dependency or in cases of increasing adversity 
(Williamson, 1991). 
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Transaction Characteristic, Uncertainty: 
Uncertainty seems to favor the firm, transactions that include elevated uncertainty 
add costs to the market.  Coase (1937) observes that,  
“With...uncertainty – the fact of ignorance and the necessity of acting upon 
opinion rather than knowledge – …the actual execution of activity, becomes in a real 
sense a secondary part of life; the primary problem or function is deciding what to do and 
how to do it (Knight, 1933)” (as cited in Coase, 1937, p. 399).   
 
Uncertainty also increases risk where information such as relevant prices are yet to be 
discovered, even if there are specialists selling that information (Coase, 1937).  Likewise, 
Figure 3, demonstrates a heightened level of uncertainty by illustrating differences 
between high and low bid, project cost and project estimate, and project cost and low bid, 
within 24 low bid/fixed cost projects in the focal institution.  
Transaction Characteristic, Asset-specificity: 
 Asset specificity, defined earlier in this theory chapter as unique or specialized 
equipment or human skills that have a narrow application, typically increase the costs of 
market governance and better align with the hierarchical form of governance, where 
greater cooperation can address the needs it introduces.  Asset specificity tends to 
increase labor costs, specifically with a higher degree of human-asset specificity, special 
knowledge and skills, adding costs to the market.   
In addition, uncertainty and adversity may increase the need for greater levels of 
coordination and cooperation, both more manageable in the firm.  Where uncertainty, 
frequency, and specificity are high, the firm, or organization, is better suited to induce the 
needed cooperation and coordination (Williamson, 1991).    
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CHAPTER 6 
THESIS METHODOLOGY 
In summary of the foregoing, market and hierarchy governance are two discrete 
forms of governance that best accommodate discrete types of transactions.  Transactions 
are most efficient when the corresponding type of governance structure is identified and 
applied (Williamson, 1991).  Given that transactions in the construction and facility 
industry are typically heterogenous, correctly identifying the right approach, or 
governance structure or structures for each depends on the transaction characteristics 
aggregated in the transaction.  With the review of governance forms, governance 
attributes, and transaction characteristics in chapter 5, it is time to move into case study 
applications.   
In what follows, four cases from the industry are presented where governance and 
transaction alignments created dissonance.  In each case study, misalignments are 
demonstrated using TCE to analyze the characteristics of the transaction and governance 
structure.  These cases all have one commonality: decisions by the firm are made based 
on a principle of hierarchy, fiat, even when the characteristics of the transaction suggest a 
different governing structure.  The result?  In each case outcome quality was poor and 
owners spent more than they intended for the outcome.  It is cases like these that led one 
disillusioned field manager to quip, “why pay only once when you can pay twice?”   
A fifth case study applies TCE principles to the production process of five small 
projects to assess compatibility of the theory with the industry.  The outcome of these 
five projects is compared against the outcome of either a comparable project or other 
defensible figure for projects that were done without TCE alignments.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CASE STUDIES 
Case Study 1:  External and Internal Relations, Contracted Project Procurement 
and Management Barriers. 
 
The purpose of this case study is to identify operational inefficiency caused by a 
particular type of governance-transaction misalignment common in the industry and use 
TCE to explain the problem.  It also uses TCE to suggest a solution, and then briefly 
recounts how and why this solution did not happen due to larger firm governance issues.  
All the case studies follow this same format.  
Case Study 1, General Industry Problem:   
Procurements are often inefficient with cost overruns, less than specified quality, 
and low customer satisfaction.  This is an issue that is both generally recognized and 
clearly unacceptable but continues to occur.  
Case Study 1:    
A coal fired boiler was to be replaced in a remote area with a propane fired boiler, 
making it necessary to move the boiler out of the basement of the building into added 
space adjacent to the building.  The controls and other parts of the boiler system were 
also to be replaced at this time.  Bid documents were prepared with designs and 
specifications provided from professional architectural and mechanical engineer 
consultants, along with specifications from in-house engineers.  The project was procured 
through the owners’ pre-selection, low-bid, fixed-cost procurement paradigm.   
The project started in August 2014 and concluded in May 2016, a schedule 15 
months longer than contracted.  The adjacent space for the boiler was constructed and the 
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boiler placed inside without incident.  However, when it came time to operate the boiler, 
it wouldn’t stay lit because it hadn’t been correctly assembled: the controls were installed 
incorrectly, and other miscellaneous parts of the system were installed incorrectly.  A 
separate boiler contractor and a controls contractor who had proven expertise were hired 
to identify and correct the errant installation and make the system functional.   
The project was significantly over budget, having been estimated to cost 
$243,000, bid at $399,000, and cost $468,000.  The owner accepted the less than 
contracted quality and released the original contractor from his contractual obligations, 
paying full contracted price, including change order costs – with the conclusion that 
litigation would have cost more than the value that could have been recovered.   Problems 
due to the installation resulted in continued boiler performance issues for the following 
three years of operation.   
Case Study 1, Diagnosis:  Observed Areas of Concern. 
1. The owner (buyer) aggregated a complex, heterogenous scope of work that 
included additional space, a boiler installation, and an idiosyncratic controls 
system, into a single transaction and then put it out to selected pre-qualified 
vendors for a low bid.    
2. The vendor’s qualification, specialization, experience, expertise, and capability 
were only a partial fit for the transaction.  While the additional space went up 
without incident, the controls system was far beyond the vendor’s expertise; and, 
the boiler system components, relative to the vendor’s expertise, created a 
significant degree of specificity (partial knowledge or capability).  The vendor 
was the lowest price, agreed they could fulfill the obligations of the contract and 
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had the requested capability, and entered into the contractual agreement with the 
owner.   
3. The selected vendors had worked previously with, and had an autonomous, non-
dependent relationship within the owner’s organization and knew that 
performance is typically not enforced.  This relationship, and weak enforcement 
reputation, may have fostered opportunistic behavior.  The vendor was hired for 
another job with the same owner not long after this failed project. 
4. In-house management focused on following a prescribed low-bid process to 
cooperate with the institutional bureaucracy while ignoring TCE principles in the 
salient transaction characteristics and governance attributes.     
Case Study 1, Discussion:  
The project transaction was aggregated in ways not aligned with specialties, 
experience, expertise, or capability of the vendor market.  This created a form of talent 
specificity by the steep and extensive learning curve for the controls system installation 
and some of the boiler system components, a degree of specificity that TCE suggests 
should be carried out by a coordinated effort within the firm rather than by contract.  In 
this case the firm would be unwise to integrate this function since there are experts that 
can perform these functions, and hiring and training a crew for this job alone would be 
cost prohibitive.  While procuring the project the owner could have either made a 
separate contract with the controls expert or identified a general contractor with the 
expertise of working with such an expert.   
 With uncertainty high, the use of a low-bid procurement method – based on price, 
to the exclusion of other more salient transaction characteristics – was mismatched to a 
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simple form of contract governance that typically accompanies a greater level of 
enforcement in this environment.  When this mismatch occurs, it typically results in 
elevated risk, and thus increased rates of failure, including dispute management 
problems.  Absent bilateral dependency between the parties, in addition to poor 
enforcement reputation, the vendor had string incentive to act opportunistically, cutting 
corners in self-interest.  Also, of interest in this case study is the presence of a third-party 
vendor, a subcontractor, selected by the vendor, who didn’t possess the needed skills.  
Case Study 1, TCE-Based Solution:  A Test. 
 A TCE based solution would potentially consider all possible characteristics of 
the transaction and match them with the best fitting governance structures, disaggregating 
where inconsistent features are grouped, minimizing relative specificity through matching 
vendor qualifications, and thus reducing uncertainty, dispute, enforcement, and 
opportunistic costs (Williamson, 1991; Coase 1937).  To test the efficacy of this solution 
the following process was proposed to the firm: 
1. Randomly select 20 similar projects, use 10 as the test and 10 as the control 
group.  Ten projects will be awarded on the traditional low-bid procurement 
method while the other 10 are awarded to contractors selected according to TCE 
prescriptions.  
a. Hypothesis: Projects aligned with TCE prescriptions will be more efficient 
and yield greater customer satisfaction. 
b. Null Hypothesis: There will be no difference between TCE alignment and 
the traditional low-bid method in terms of money saved and the quality of 
the outcome. 
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Test Results:  
A list of potential projects was generated using owner’s data.  Permission to test 
the hypothesis was requested at multiple levels as outlined below:   
a. Request sent to professional client level staff, directing engineers and 
architects.   
i. Rejected request; not interested, too difficult to make exceptions 
for this. 
b. Requested of the director of the purchasing department. 
ii. Rejected request: not interested. 
c. Requested approval to run analysis as part of this thesis was sent to the 
director of the facilities department.  
iii. Request was redirected to headquarters team-leader for 
experimental projects. 
iv. Rejected request: directed to send request through direct chain of 
command. 
d. Sent this test proposal through the traditional chain of command, using 
their format, see Figure 4. 
v. The request was presented fall of 2017, and then again in January 
of 2018 to the regional and area physical facilities managers.  
Requested projects at three levels of funding.   
1. $20,000 to $30,000 
2. $50,000 to $100,000 
3. Over $90,000 
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vi. Request rejected: projects and permissions were “too difficult” to 
obtain.  Directed to try working with peer managers on low dollar 
projects under $30,000, where field management has more 
discretion. 
e. Requested projects between $20,000 and $30,000 from peer facilities 
managers. 
vii. Very few options, not enough for random sample test and control 
groupings.  
viii. Peers were not interested in participating, it made matters more 
complicated for them, and inconvenience became their concern. 
In the end, projects were not made available to test the hypothesis.  In each 
scenario above, management explicitly noted that it would be very difficult to get 
permission from upper management to run this experiment, except for projects under 
$30,000 where field management has some discretion within procedural boundaries.   
Case Study 1, Conclusion:   
In case study 1 we found a high degree of uncertainty and specificity created 
when the owner hired a vendor to perform work that was outside of their capability – 
resulting in failure.  Adaptation issues became apparent when the firm was approached 
with alternative project management methods and was unable to allow significant tests.  
Even with a significant failure the firm wasn’t motivated to change the paradigm.  Future 
research could explore causes of barriers between levels of management, and firm 
adaptation difficulties.  Relationship dynamics of a third-party vendor may also be 
important to consider. 
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Figure 4.  Proposal for Alternative Project Procurement 
Case Study 2:  External Relations, Contracted Services Procurement. 
Case 2, General Industry Problem:  
 Project transactions that are aggregated by the firm often don’t align with vendor 
specialties, experience, expertise, and capability and create situations of relative 
specificity or uncertainty, increasing transaction costs.  Governance structures’ 
inconsistency with transactions characteristics introduce additional challenges.   
Case Study 2:    
Mid-season, after local contractors had been performing to expectations for at 
least two months for a large, multi-regional organization, the organization’s management 
implemented a “landscape-category-management, outcome-based” groundskeeping 
services contract across the region.  The owner prepared the contract and scope, issued a 
request for proposal (RFP) to vendors they had prequalified, sketched out three 
geographical boundaries across 13 field management areas, and then selected one vendor 
for each area based on the most reasonable proposal – excluding some proposals that 
looked “too low”.   Field managers were directed to terminate existing contracts so 
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management could implement the new contract.  The new paradigm boasted two major 
points:  First, it claimed existing contracts were too prescriptive and drove up costs by 
telling the expert how to do the job; so, by removing prescriptive language the expert 
could perform to a generalized “green and clean” outcome, rather than performing to 
unnecessary dictations.  This would streamline the process for the expert.  Second, 
economies of scale could obtain and thus decrease costs by increasing the quantity of 
work per vendor.  In a written letter to the field managers and customers, the director 
guaranteed the unusual concept would provide the same or better quality while 
significantly reducing costs.   
To the contrary, the remainder of that first year and following three years proved 
to be disastrous for groundskeeping.  Quality severely decreased, customer satisfaction 
reached a record low, and contract enforcement costs were exacerbated.  Other vendors 
were hired at times to address performance issues that the contracted vendor was not 
fulfilling.  The owner accepted the less than contracted quality and paid the full 
contracted amount, justifying their “experts” performance issues as a “learning curve” – 
defying the very definition of “expert”.  Then, for the last year of the contract the owner 
increased the contract amount by 18% to motivate the contractor to perform.  Much to the 
consternation of the owner there was no significant improvement to the performance of 
the contractor.  Poor performance proved to be inevitable for this disastrous agreement.  
Case 2, Diagnosis:  Observed Areas of Concern. 
1. The owner/buyer aggregated a complex, heterogenous scope of work.  In this 
instance, this included lawn maintenance such as mowing, edging, and clean-up; 
lawn treatments such as herbicide and fertilizer application; irrigation system 
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maintenance such as valve and solenoid, head, and line repair, as well as irrigation 
clock schedules and adjustments; and, shrub bed maintenance such as weed and 
trash removal, as well as shrub and tree trimming.  All were aggregated into a 
single transaction, with a single dollar figure per this aggregated transaction, and 
then awarded to the selected vendor.    
2. The vendor selected for the contract was only partially qualified for the scope of 
work, and hired multiple smaller third-party vendor start-ups who had no previous 
experience with groundskeeping business to perform much of the work.  
Trimming, mowing, and clean-up aren’t too difficult to learn, but the irrigation 
system maintenance and lawn treatments, relative to the vendors’ expertise, 
created an extremely high degree of specificity (no knowledge or capability).    
3. The relationship between owner and vendor was absent any form of bilateral 
dependency; the identity of either group did not bind them to the transaction 
(Williamson, 1991).  Either party could terminate the exchange without 
significant loss.  The owner could easily find a new groundskeeper and the vendor 
could easily find a new customer.   
4. The “outcome-based” contract is a neoclassic contract, very informal and very 
vague, without any dispute management and enforcement machinery, so that 
when coupled with uncertainty and a weak dependency relationship, opportunistic 
behaviors occurred (Williamson, 1991).   
Case Study 2, Discussion:  
The project transaction was aggregated in ways not aligned with specialties, 
experience, expertise, or capability of the vendor.  While the vague contract language was 
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intended to give the vendor liberty to deliver based on expertise, the vendor was not 
expert in all areas of the heterogenous contract, thus increasing the specificity and 
uncertainty relative to the vendors capability.  These transaction characteristics were 
mismatched with a hybrid form of governance that typically accompanies a significant 
level of enforcement and dispute management.  However, absent bilateral dependency 
between the parties, and considering poor enforcement and dispute management 
machinery, the vendor was motivated to act opportunistically, cutting corners and 
neglecting contractual obligations (Williamson, 1991).     
Case Study 2, TCE-Based Solution: 
 There won’t be a new TCE-based solution to introduce to the organization for this 
case study.  The same principles from case study 1 TCE-based solution apply here.  
These include selecting the vendor based on qualifications to perform all aspects of the 
heterogenous transaction, utilizing correctly drawn contracts that address the 
characteristics of the transaction and bring governance in line with these concerns, and 
arranging for coordination and cooperation where specificity is high.  
Case Study 2, Conclusion:   
Two points the firm boasted as revolutionary advancements were central 
weaknesses of the procurement.  First, the owner dictated the boundary and thus the scale 
of the work, rather than letting the boundary align with the capability of the specialists; 
and, second, the owner dictated the contract and thus the scope of the work, aggregating 
heterogenous transactions rather than aligning them to the specialization, experience, 
expertise, and capability of the vendor.  Transaction characteristics were not aligned with 
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compatible governance forms, yielding far less than optimal functionality (Williamson, 
1991).   
Case Study 3: Internal Relations, Measurement and Conformity Management 
Case Study 3, General Industry Problem:   
To incentivize desired behavior, regular audits measure performance based on 
how well personnel conform to policy and process.  Audits examine whether a budget 
was produced, and how funds were spent, work was completed, and expenses were coded 
as per policy and process.   Thus, in this system, management uses this information to 
measure whether funds were misappropriated, not whether they were inefficiently spent.  
Success in this formality is defined by procedural conformity, regardless of the economic 
outcome.  The firm dictates budget and project preparation, classification, process, and 
policy without providing efficiency-management and measurement tools. 
Case Study 3:   
Availability of comparative finance data for budget and project planning, 
forecasting, and efficiency-management is extremely limited and difficult to use in the 
focal firm, which happens to be located on the far end of the governance spectrum at the 
point of subordination, a master/servant relationship.  Financial data for comparison 
across Facilities Management groups, by accounting code, over any period, has hitherto 
been nonexistent. This inhibits efforts in the field to increase efficiency of funds spent. 
Case Study 3, Diagnosis:   
Characteristics of the firm are key here.  The hierarchical governance style of the 
firm leads it to employ a flat incentive structure, which keeps motivation flat as well 
(Nickerson and Zenger, 2008).  Field management shares little if any ownership in the 
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processes of the firm, and performance efficiency measurement apparatuses are entirely 
absent.   Incentives for such apparatuses are naturally present when autonomy and 
decentralization are the paradigm.  In the hierarchical governance structure within this 
firm, autonomy, market-like incentives, and ownership would likely cause a conflict 
between control and efficiency (Nickerson and Zenger, 2008). 
While a virtue of hierarchy is that anyone can be induced to follow the rules 
without having to think too much or know too much, the downside is that motivation to 
measure efficiency is low. 
Case Study 3, Discussion:    
This may be a tradeoff problem: efficiency measurement machinery could 
empower the field manager, while creating central control problems for a firm based on 
hierarchy; to favor one is to disfavor the other.  Social comparison as noted by Nickerson 
and Zenger (2008) could then potentially become an issue if a firm were to install 
efficiency measurement devices, particularly where incentives are flat.  Personnel may 
question, “Why am I being paid the same or less than him or her when I am more 
efficient and save the company more money?”  Social comparison brings social 
comparison costs to the firm: envy, with several costly manifestations; these tradeoffs 
and problems do not arise under a market-style governance structure (Nickerson and 
Zenger, 2008).  If the firm has no intention to decentralize, shift autonomy to the field, 
and apply market-like incentives - the tradeoff is efficiency or control.  Thus, given the 
chosen governance style, the firm is left to dictate means and methods without discussing 
performance management, and efficiency suffers as a result.  Alignment of specialization, 
experience, expertise, or capability with the task is not only considered unnecessary, but 
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problematic to the control paradigm of the hierarchical governance style. Thus, while 
work tasks may be organized, they are not economized.    
Case Study 3, TCE-Based Solution:   
If the firm desires greater efficiency, a potential solution would be to adopt the 
type of optimal functionality paradigm described by Nickerson and Zenger (2002), where 
formal hierarchical governance structure is complimented by an informal governance 
structure that allows for greater autonomy within certain bounds.  A similar approach was 
attempted in case study two, but other problems with the attempt led to a poor outcome.  
When done with TCE alignment principles in mind, however, it has been shown to 
reduce costs significantly – regardless of the formal governance structure of the firm.    
 One way to do this would be to put an information system in place that provides 
information to field managers that clearly reveals inefficient performance in a way that 
would prompt efficient deviation from the formal conformity paradigm at the top of the 
firm.  The researcher proposed such a test, as follows:     
1. The researcher developed a tool in Microsoft Excel that enables field managers to 
utilize a collection of both historical financial planning and expense data to judge 
his or her performance efficiency.    
a. Hypothesis:  Performance information will prompt field management 
efficiency alignments. 
b. Null Hypothesis:  There will be no difference between behavior in the 
presence or absence of this information.    
2. The researcher shared this tool, informally, with other FM groups in the region.  
The tool made it possible to compare and contrast data across FM groups by year 
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and accounting category and code.  Metrics were available in both dollars and 
cost-per-square-foot.  The tool graphically showed trends, compared performance 
against similar FM groups, and revealed areas for improving efficiency.  For 
examples of the vast data made available to field managers, see Figures 5, 6, and 
7 which show data from the interface and display of the tool.  As can be seen, the 
tool provided the specific ability to compare planning and spending behavior over 
time and across areas.  As an unintended consequence, it also provided a medium 
for upper management to micro-analyze and micro-manage the managers.   
Regional management showed great interest in this tool at first, because it opened 
a window for them to view spending behavior, and it was quickly adopted by the 
focal region and then spread to a neighboring region.   
 The tool was utilized for the 2017, 2018, and 2019 planning cycles and then was 
discontinued without comment.   This research sent an email to the regional manager to 
ask for his opinion and request permission to survey the region about what they liked and 
didn’t like about the tool, but the email was dismissed, and permission was not granted.    
The approach correlated with TCE and field management experienced an increase 
in efficiency during its use.  However, its discontinuance suggests that the central 
hierarchy might have been aware of the tradeoffs and problems that arise with efficiency 
comparisons within a firm that does not intend to adopt a more market-based style of 
compensation.   
Case Study 3, Conclusion:   
While with formal governance the master/servant relationship in this institution 
favors obedience over efficiency and the firm believes that an acceptable outcome is 
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induced through process and policy, it is suggested here that the inertia of informal 
governance may be altered through the presence of efficiency aligned information 
(Nickerson and Zenger, 2002).  The goal is to locate the performance of informal 
governance between centralization and decentralization, where most heterogenous 
transaction occurs, to utilize benefits of both forms of governance.  Adaptation of formal 
governance structure in this institution is not likely to happen, but personnel can act 
efficiently if allowed to do so.  However, any fear mongering or other authoritarian 
threats to personnel for deviation would damage this effort.   
 
Figure 5.  Analytical Tool Data Verification 
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Figure 6.  Analytical Tool Comparison Across Codes 
 
Figure 7.  Analytical Tool Comparison Across Categories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  41 
Case Study 4:  Internal Relations, Budget Planning and Preparation 
 
Case Study 4, General Industry Problem:   
Data employed in the previous case study revealed that field managers typically 
request more funding than needed in annual operations and maintenance budgets, 
resulting in misallocated funds and opportunity costs to the firm.  Budgets are prepared as 
directed by upper management to an extensive level of detail; each detail introduces an 
increased risk of misallocating funds or padding each number to some extent.  
Case Study 4:   
The focal firm dictates zero based budget production by accounting code.  This 
process aggregates collection of all data from each field manager under one code or 
another and neglects the fact that each type of project needs a unique approach.  Some 
codes are better planned for on a macro scale at a higher administrative level where 
information is more readily available and takes on greater accuracy and some are better 
planned on the micro level.  In this case, field managers don’t possess the resources or 
expertise to budget accurately for some of the codes.  Uncertainty and fear of retribution 
leads field management to “pad” their budgets.  For instance, a comparison of funds 
requested to funds spent in 2017 shows that region X requested $466,146 more than it 
spent for a “Core” set of accounting codes, see Figure 8.  There are approximately 41 
regions in the United States.  If each region requested like region X, it would misallocate 
$19,112,006 dollars annually, tying up scarce resources that could be used by the firm for 
other projects.  The percentage of the total annual budget this accounts for is unknown.  
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Figure 8.  Dollars Requested vs. Dollars Spent for Core Category in 2017 
Case Study 4, Diagnosis:   
1. The firm, acting authoritatively, dictates the format for budget planning, while 
neglecting field management expertise and limitations.  Inducing field personnel 
to do something they aren’t capable of doing increases the specificity of the task. 
2. Increased specificity demands increased cooperation and coordination, where 
upper management should step in and assist with the task.  This isn’t happening, 
so the firm experiences a greater degree of inefficiency in allocating its funds.    
Case Study 4, Discussion:   
Analysis of historic expenses by accounting code for the last five years shows that 
a “Core” group of accounting codes is predictably consistent and composes between 50% 
to 57% of expenses each year over five years, see Figure 9.  These codes, if planned for 
at a higher level, could reduce risk of “padded” budgets.   
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Figure 9.  Dollars Spent, 2013 Through 2017, by Classification 
Case Study 4, TCE-Based Solution:   
Using the basic principles of TCE, the author proposed to disaggregate the budget 
process and plan for individual codes at the level they are best addressed: the field 
manager planning those codes that best align with transactions that are best known in the 
field, and administration forecasting core costs with greater accuracy on a larger scale.  
Utilizing historical finance data, a set of core costs were identified, by accounting code, 
which illustrates a predictable corpus of spending per year over the last five years.  An 
example budget forecast was prepared with a dollar amount for each accounting code in 
the core set for the 2019 budget cycle for each of the 12 field management groups in the 
region.  The purpose of this effort was to determine if a budget can be predicted for a 
specific set of codes at a macro level with greater accuracy than a budget that is predicted 
for the same set of codes in greater detail at the micro level.  
a. Hypothesis:  Budget planning for predictable costs on a broader scale 
(macro) will reduce risk of overbudgeting, whereas micro budgeting 
accentuates overbudgeting. 
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b. Null Hypothesis: There will be no difference between these budget 
methods. 
The concept of creating categories of predictability in the accounting code 
schedule is not, and hasn’t been, utilized in the budgeting process of this institution 
generally.  So, the researcher gathered these data and developed and introduced this idea 
during February 2018 (for the 2019 planning cycle) to a group of field managers at a 
regional meeting.  See Figure 12 for a side by side comparison of the traditional approach 
vs. the modified accounting code approach suggested at this meeting.  During the 
meeting the following were completed by the researcher: 
a. Presented the new data and the proposed budget to the other Field 
Managers  
b. Presented data and proposed budget to the Regional Manager 
c. Surveyed Facilities Managers for their response to the questions listed in 
Figure 10.  The questions presented in Figure 10 are exactly as they were 
presented to the respondents.  After presenting the modified accounting 
code schedules to these managers, the author sent survey to them to 
capture their perception about the adequacy of the material presented, the 
adaptability of the institution, and their own adaptability.  All survey 
responses were done in anonymity.  All yes responses were positive 
feedback and all no answers were negative feedback.  
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Figure 10.  Questions of Follow-up Survey to Test II Presentation 
As the new approach could not be adopted without approval from the central 
hierarchy, and this was deemed unlikely, the survey simply captured sentiments from 
participants about how helpful the new approach might be to them if used, and whether 
they would adopt it.  Figure 11 presents the results in graph from.  There were 12 
participants in total who completed the survey.  All respondents had been employed for at 
least five years, and the majority for over 10 years, at the time of this survey.  On the 
graph, the circle at each point contains the number of responses, out of 12, to provide yes 
and no answers to each question. 
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1 Material
Presentation – Was the material presented in an 
understandable and convincing way? (could an FM 
understand what was being proposed?) Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 Material
Timeliness – Was the method provided in enough 
time that it could have been implemented (at our 
level) for the current budgeting cycle? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
3 Institution
Institutional compatibility – Was the working 
environment conducive to shifting over to this way 
of budgeting?  (Would the current planning process 
allow for it?) Yes No No No No No Yes (b   No No Yes No Yes
4 Material
Material – Was the format of the material clear, 
understandable, and usable?  (could an FM have 
actually used the proposed 2019 core budget 
amounts if our current planning process had 
allowed it?) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
5 Institution
Institutional adaptability – Do you think the 
institution would have accommodated a change to 
process to allow this planning method if we had 
insisted? Yes No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
6 Personnel
Personal adaptability – Would you, personally, have 
used the 2019 core budget amounts if the current 
planning process had allowed it? Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Figure 11.  Perception of Institutional Adaptability, Test II 
Survey results indicated that most personnel believed the material was timely, 
presented to their understanding, and could be implemented if the institution allowed it.  
The majority indicated they possessed the adaptability necessary to make the change.   
On the other hand, the majority indicated their belief that institutional norms would not 
allow this to happen.  The regional manager supported the idea but wasn’t ready to 
support it through the institution for broader adoption.  The effort was discontinued, and 
the test was not completed.   
Case Study 4, Conclusion:   
Costs in the “core” set of accounting codes are predictable, most accurate at a 
high level, and constitute over half the annual budget.  Yet, field managers are directed to 
produce a micro-level forecast every year and typically over-budget in fear of potential 
shortfalls.  This phenomenon demonstrates a weakness of hierarchy.  Unlike previous 
cases where the firm dictated processes that TCE suggests should have been left to the 
expert, in this case a transaction that best fits a higher level of coordination and 
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technology was left to the field managers.  Both types of mismatches, and their attendant 
inefficiencies, could be avoided by applying TCE. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Modified Accounting Code Schedule, With Priority Level 
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Case Study 5:  TCE Applications to Small Project Procurements 
The foregoing cases illustrate some of the problems general to the industry, as 
well as problems specific to the firm.  Each case described a problem, offered a 
diagnosis, and then concluded with a brief discussion of procedures TCE might suggest 
for reaching a better outcome.  It was illustrated how TCE characteristics of uncertainty, 
frequency, and specificity when correctly aligned with governance structure, could 
increase efficiency: provide a better product in less time and for less cost.  Throughout 
the cases, difficulty aligning with TCE was a common theme among the firm.  In this 
final case study, four illustrations are provided to demonstrate how even in such a 
context, TCE principles applied at the margins can still yield improved outcomes—even 
when the firm is unwilling to adopt broader changes.  Organizational procedural barriers 
and imposed integrations are bypassed using smaller but similar projects as informal 
comparison to demonstrate a valid strategy that appears to be consistently effective.  A 
discussion of the concepts found in each follows.  See Figure 13 for a dollar by dollar 
comparison for these project examples. 
Case Study 5, Project Examples with TCE Applications to Industry Concerns: 
Example #1:  Landscape Improvement Project. 
 
A landscape improvement project had been planned for a property in a remote 
location.  The scope of work included paver installation, irrigation system installation, 
and shrub bed mulch and plants.  The field manager solicited a well-qualified and 
experienced vendor for a non-competitive proposal for the entire scope of work, he priced 
the work at $29,570.  Then, to test these TCE principles explained in this thesis, the field 
manager disaggregated the scope of work and invited multiple specialties to perform a 
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part of the project where they either had experience or could easily learn the task, while 
in-house staff were included for small miscellaneous portions of work that didn’t align 
well with the specialties.  Upon completion, the project cost was approximately $17,300, 
with inhouse costs included.  The difference between these two alternative methods of 
organization was approximately $12,270.  A discussion of applicable TCE principles is 
had in the discussion section later in this chapter. 
Example #2:  Irrigation Filtration Project. 
 
Grounds are typically irrigated by secondary water in most rural communities in 
the region.  Because secondary water carries suspended particles of debris, the water 
needs to be filtered before it is sent into the irrigation systems or it will plug off irrigation 
heads.  In 2018, two properties in rural communities about two hours apart had scheduled 
a filtration upgrade in two separate field management areas that will be referred to as A 
and B.  The scope and scale of each project was closely similar, making the projects an 
ideal setting for comparing TCE principles in project organization.  
Field manager A gave the scope and specifications for the entire project to a 
vendor considered expert at this work and requested a proposal; the project was priced at 
$26,233 but actually cost $27,695 upon completion.  On the other hand, field manager B 
utilized TCE principles to align governance and transaction characteristics by 
disaggregating the scope of work and inviting qualified specialties to perform the parts of 
work they were most expert at.  In-house staff were included in the project for small 
miscellaneous portions of the work that didn’t fit well with the specialties of the vendors.  
Matching the parts of the transaction and the respective characteristics to specialties in 
this way, this project for field manager B cost approximately $10,077, including an 
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approximated $400 for inhouse labor, and it even included an additional scope of work 
discussed below.  The cost difference in the two projects was approximately $17,695.   
For field manager B, disaggregation of the transaction meant moving from a 
single transaction to 15 transactions.  Each disaggregated part of the overall transaction 
was intended to reduce the specificity of the overall transaction.  This took more 
administrative time, but it was time already paid for and didn’t incur additional costs to 
the firm.  However, there is a cost here that is difficult to account for exactly.  What is the 
time taken for coordination worth? 
In addition, because the project was going well, field manager B added a scope of 
work to include an additional property improvement costing approximately $3,000, 
installing a 12-foot-tall parking light lamp with post and footing—work that matched the 
specialties of vendors already on the job, thus reducing the relative individual cost of 
both, making the comparative cost difference between the two focal projects, A and B, 
even greater.   
Field manager B performed a second irrigation filter project, with greater concrete 
and electrical work, in a separate location requiring entirely separate vendors.  This 
project also experienced cost reductions in comparison to the project performed by field 
manager A.  See Figure 13, and the discussion below, for more information. 
Example #3:  Roof Project Procurements. 
 
Roofing projects were planned for two similar pavilions in two rural neighboring 
towns about 13 miles apart.  These two pavilions will be referred to as C and D.  A 
consultant was hired to design, competitively bid, and manage the roofing project for one 
pavilion roof (C), while the other pavilion roof project (D) was used as a TCE aligned 
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project experiment.  The cost of the completed project managed by the consultant on 
project C was $26,737.  The cost of the completed project D managed by the field 
manager was $13,084.  The scope of work for both projects was similar, except for the 
more expensive pavilion roof (C) being slightly larger.  The difference between the two 
alternative methods of procurement is approximately $13,653.   
Example #4: Kitchen Upgrade 
 A design consultant estimated the kitchen upgrade at $40,000, or $36,400 less his 
fees.  The project was disaggregated and coordinated inhouse aligning the capability of 
the vendors with specialties and inhouse labor for miscellaneous work.  The work was 
completed for $16,782, which is $19,618 less than estimated.  
 
Figure 13. Cost Comparisons for Coordinated Work 
Case Study 5, Diagnosis: 
How did TCE alignments reduce project costs, and still reach a high-quality 
outcome? 
1. A key characteristic of each transaction above is low specificity and reduced 
uncertainty, achieved through vendors who had the experience, expertise, and 
capability for the work they were performing with a focus on only what they 
had the capability to do best.  Greater coordination and inhouse cooperation 
were stressed where areas of uncertainty were the greatest.  Although this 
Project 
# Title
Production 
Procurement 
Method
Manag
ed By
Estimated 
Cost Total Cost
Comparable 
Bid
Comparable 
Estimate
Comparable 
Project
Difference 
From 
Comparable 
(savings)
1 Landscape mulch beds, rock mulch, shrubs and irrigation Coordination FM 29,750.00$    17,300.00$    29,750.00$ 12,450.00$ 
2 Irrigation filter and post lamp Coordination FM 18,769.00$    9,677.42$      27,695.00$    18,017.58$ 
3 Irrigation filter and door/lock replacement Coordination FM 16,503.00$    10,554.62$    27,695.00$    17,140.38$ 
4 Pavilion reroof Coordination FM 12,882.00$    13,083.75$    26,737.00$    13,653.25$ 
5 Serving Area Replacement/upgrade Coordination FM 36,400.00$    16,781.85$    36,400.00$    19,618.15$ 
TOTAL 80,879.36$ 
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increased the quantity of transactions, it greatly simplified the overall 
performance, reduced uncertainty, and reduced costs.  
2. The field manager coordinated any unforeseen conditions, changes in scope, 
and other surprises, paying for any extra issues as they arose.   
3. The vendors were given only the most relevant information, such as a 
proposed scope and specifications, and then asked to prepare their scope and 
bid, which became the contract – making contract completeness a simple 
objective that was driven by the vendors experience, capability, and expertise.  
4. Given these transaction characteristics, we were able to govern this work with 
very simple, clear, purchase orders with each vendor.    
Case Study 5, Discussion: 
In each of the examples above, we reduced cost by applying this simple TCE 
alignment insight: reduce specificity and uncertainty by aligning the vendors with what 
they do best and cover the miscellanea inhouse where coordination and cooperation are 
best.   
It could be assumed that the higher priced vendor in each of the comparable 
projects would have likely disaggregated and aligned the transactions with expertise in 
the appropriate governance form, winning these cost differences shown here as a 
premium profit for his/her own; however, this assumption was certainly a point of failure 
that brought additional costs to the owner in both case study one and two.    
A few questions that arise from this study are as follows: How much of a cost 
reduction is enough to make in-house project organization alignments truly efficient and 
cost effective, given time commitments for application?  Where is the sweet spot, or the 
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optimal range for these concepts to yield the highest paybacks?  When does it cost more 
to coordinate and align corresponding characteristics of transactions and forms of 
governance than it costs to operate in suboptimal, yet bearable conditions?  What other 
motivations, aside from these TCE alignments, would determine whether a firm would 
bring a function inhouse or outsource it, and why would they be considered over TCE? 
Case Study 5, Conclusion: 
Transaction heterogeneity can be mitigated through disaggregation of the 
heterogeneous scope and aligning each part with its proper form of governance by 
matching transaction characteristics with appropriate governance structures, to achieve 
efficiency and optimum functionality (Williamson, 1991).     
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CHAPTER 8 
DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND RESULTS 
Research Methodology:   
TCE principles were applied through experimentation and retrospectively through 
observation in five case studies, to look for patterns of cause and effect relationships that 
could be explained by TCE.  This thesis proposes that TCE can be reliably used as a 
model for predicting and thus preventing high rates of failure, at least within a 
corresponding scope and scale in the industry.  The scale has been small and the scope, 
simple, but the connections made encourage future exploration and development of these 
ideas.   
Data Collection/Characteristics:   
Data collected has been more theoretical and less empirical.  Although difficult to 
obtain empirical data here, both in this organization and this industry, there is no better 
place to study these concepts than in the fertile confluence of construction and facility 
industries where markets, hierarchies, and hybrids mingle and often clash.   
Five case studies have combined both observation and experimentation to apply 
transaction cost economics theory to real issues in the industry.   
Data Analysis:   
Data analysis has been limited to observation and interpretation.  
Results: 
 In Case Study 1, a market transaction for a project was misaligned with a high 
degree of uncertainty and specificity.  The vendor lacked the knowledge and skill to 
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meet the high degree of coordination.  The project was over budget, past schedule, and 
of a poor quality.  
In Case Study 2, a hybrid transaction for a service was misaligned with a high 
degree of uncertainty and specificity.  The vendor lacked the knowledge and skill to 
meet the high degree of coordination and the services weren’t fully delivered.   
 In Case Study 3, a firm centralized a task (performance analysis), limiting 
autonomy and keeping incentives flat by reducing competitive information available to 
field management.   
 In Case Study 4, a firm decentralized a task (budget planning), passing 
uncertainty and a higher degree of specificity onto field management without the 
autonomy or ownership (incentive) to be accurate.   This created an impetus to 
overbudget.  
 In Case Study 5, several projects were disaggregated, or decentralized, and tasks 
assigned to vendors with skills and knowledge to reduce specificity and uncertainty.  
Inhouse staff were assigned tasks where greater specificity and thus coordination were 
needed.  The result was greater quality at a lower cost than found in comparisons, 
without the cost/quality tradeoff.  Delivering high quality at a low cost required an 
administrative time investment in coordination, which is difficult to account for.   
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis is motivated by a desire to identify causes for specific industry 
problems with product delivery performance and business failure.  Underlying 
characteristics that challenge the industry were identified through analysis of certain 
industry activities.  Real industry examples were provided to exemplify the problems and 
suggest that performance concerns arise as a result of inappropriate responses to these 
unique characteristics. 
This research proposes that most industry problems can be understood and 
mitigated by the application of transaction-cost economics.  TCE suggests that these 
problems arise from misalignments between the characteristics of transactions and the 
attributes of governance structures (Williamson, 1991).  Several examples of 
misalignments between transaction characteristics and governance forms have been 
provided through the case studies which concluded that alignments combining consistent 
features can reduce problems and reduce costs.  
As is exemplified by the firm where these case studies have been taken, and many 
others in the industry, it is evident that use of TCE requires in depth knowledge and 
skillful application.  As evident from the firm’s reluctance to modify existing traditions 
and processes, encouraging the adoption of TCE will require just as much if not more 
skill.  In the meantime, firms in the industry will likely continue to pay twice, after all, 
“why pay only once when you can pay twice?”   
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